Fee simple absolute vs. defeasible fee

1. An express automatic return

Assume a valid grant: O conveys land to a library so long as it is used for library purposes, with title expressly returning automatically to O when that use ends.

1. The grant has a duration limitation and an express automatic ending.
2. The interest returns to the grantor rather than a third party.

Answer: The library holds a fee simple determinable; O retains a possibility of reverter.

2. A reserved choice after breach

Assume a valid grant: O conveys land to City on condition that it remain a park, reserving a right to terminate after breach. The instrument does not provide an automatic return.

1. The grant retains a termination power.
2. Breach alone does not complete the title return. The proper holder must exercise the right through lawful procedure.

Answer: City holds fee simple subject to condition subsequent; O retains a right of entry or power of termination.

3. A third-party gift over

For classification only, assume valid interests: O conveys to A, but on the stated event title passes automatically to B. B is a third party, not O.

1. The event divests A in favor of someone other than the conveyor.
2. This is not a grantor's reverter merely because A's estate is conditional.

Answer: A holds fee simple subject to an executory limitation; B holds an executory interest. Actual validity requires its own analysis.

4. A covenant with different remedies

Assume a valid subdivision covenant prohibits commercial signs and permits an injunction and specified fines. It contains no title-divesting terms or future estate.

1. The stated restriction regulates use.
2. The stated remedies do not themselves establish title forfeiture.

Answer: These facts describe a covenant, not enough to classify the fee as defeasible.

5. A purpose that is not a forfeiture clause

A deed expresses a hope that the property will serve a neighborhood project. The full exam facts specify no title limitation, termination right or gift over.

1. A hoped-for purpose alone is not a stated divesting mechanism.
2. Do not supply forfeiture words that the facts omit.

Answer: The stated purpose alone does not establish a defeasible fee.

6. Selling the present conditional fee

A holds a valid determinable fee with a still-effective limitation. A sells that same estate to B; no release, extinguishment or other title-changing rule is stipulated.

1. The sale does not itself erase the valid limitation.
2. Transfer of the present fee is different from a purported separate assignment of the grantor's future interest.

Answer: B takes the stated conditional estate. A real title result also requires the instrument, chain of title and applicable notice rules.

7. A 55-year unbroken Illinois interest

A covered Illinois possibility of reverter was created 55 years ago. The condition has never been broken. Assume no applicable statutory exception or other fact changing the analysis.

1. Section 4 uses a 40-year maximum from creation for the specified unbroken interests.
2. A deed saying forever does not enlarge that statutory period.

Answer: The 55-year interest is beyond the stated Section 4 validity period. This study conclusion is not permission for a broker to delete a real title exception.

8. First breach and repeated breaches

For a Section 13-102 timing comparison, assume a valid Illinois condition subsequent is first broken in 2025. Similar breaches recur in 2028. Set aside any other applicable exception or disputed fact.

1. Section 13-102 uses seven years after the first breach.
2. Continuing, successive or recurring breaches do not extend that time.
3. For a year-only anniversary comparison, 2025 + 7 = 2032. Restarting from the 2028 recurrence would incorrectly suggest 2035. No exact filing date is determined from years alone.

Answer: Use the first breach for this comparison. The actual filing or entry question requires its own legal analysis; do not add 40 years.

9. Inheritance is not an assignment

An Illinois grantor dies holding a covered possibility of reverter. A student says that Section 1's nonalienability and nondevisability mean the interest cannot pass by inheritance either.

1. The statute prohibits alienation and devise of the specified interests.
2. Mahrenholz expressly distinguishes their inheritability from those prohibited transfers.

Answer: The student has merged different modes of succession. Identify the actual lawful holder rather than assuming every proposed transferee qualifies.

10. What the 1981 Mahrenholz appeal actually decided

In Mahrenholz v. County Board of School Trustees, the appellate court construed a school-purpose grant and reviewed dismissal of a quiet-title complaint.

1. It classified the deed as a determinable fee followed by a possibility of reverter.
2. It reversed dismissal and remanded. It did not decide whether school purposes had actually ceased, whether the later conveyance was sufficient or whether the disclaimer was effective.

Answer: Use the case for the distinction and its actual procedural result. Do not report it as a final finding that storage use triggered forfeiture or that the plaintiffs had already won title.

1. Which statement correctly compares fee simple absolute with a defeasible fee?

1. A defeasible fee necessarily ends at the first owner's death.
2. Absolute means there can be no easement or lien.
3. Both are forms of fee simple, but the defeasible estate can be cut short by its valid stated event.
4. Only the absolute estate is a freehold.

2. Assume a valid grant expressly ends automatically and returns to O, the grantor, when library use stops. What estate and future interest fit?

1. Condition subsequent and remainder.
2. Life estate and right of entry.
3. Determinable fee and possibility of reverter.
4. Absolute fee and executory interest.

3. Assume a valid grant reserves O a choice to terminate after a stated breach and does not provide automatic return. Which future interest does O retain?

1. An executory interest in a third party.
2. A remainder.
3. A right of entry or power of termination.
4. A possibility of reverter.

4. For classification only, assume a valid grant to A automatically divests in favor of B, a person other than the grantor, upon the stated event. What does B hold?

1. A reversion following a life estate.
2. The grantor's possibility of reverter.
3. A right of entry retained by the grantor.
4. An executory interest.

5. A valid covenant restricts signs and authorizes an injunction and specified fines, but the stipulated facts contain no title-divesting terms or future estate. What is best?

1. Private covenants are always zoning ordinances.
2. The covenant does not by itself establish a defeasible fee.
3. Any restriction automatically creates a determinable fee.
4. The first sign necessarily returns ownership to the developer.

6. A student sees the word revert in a deed and stops reading. What is the best correction?

1. Every such deed must create a life estate.
2. Read the whole instrument, including its limitation, retained power and next holder.
3. That word conclusively proves automatic return in every Illinois deed.
4. Purpose language alone always supplies forfeiture.

7. A sells a valid conditional fee with its limitation still effective. No release, extinguishment or other title-changing rule is stipulated. What does the sale alone establish?

1. That B necessarily received unrestricted absolute title.
2. That the limitation disappeared.
3. That the sale alone does not remove the stated limitation.
4. That a mortgage automatically nullifies the future interest.

8. An Illinois interest falls within 765 ILCS 330/4, has remained unbroken and has no applicable exception. What maximum validity period does that section prescribe from creation?

1. Forever if the deed says forever.
2. 40 years.
3. Seven years after every recurring breach.
4. A universal 47 years.

9. For a Section 13-102 comparison, a valid condition subsequent is first broken in 2025 and recurring breaches happen in 2028. Ignore other exceptions or disputed facts. Which statement is correct?

1. The recurring breach necessarily restarts the period through 2035.
2. The owner may wait indefinitely because the deed is recorded.
3. Use seven years after the first breach; recurring breaches do not extend that time.
4. Always add 40 years before starting the seven.

10. Under Illinois Section 1 and the distinction discussed in Mahrenholz, does nonalienable and nondevisable necessarily mean noninheritable?

1. Yes; all future interests disappear at death.
2. Yes; the three terms are identical.
3. No; inheritance is a different mode of succession.
4. No; every person may therefore buy the untriggered interest by deed.

11. What did the 1981 Mahrenholz appellate decision do?

1. Finally awarded title to the plaintiffs on every issue.
2. Finally found that storage use necessarily breached school purposes.
3. Classified the deed as determinable, reversed dismissal and remanded while reserving specified remaining issues.
4. Held that every deed using revert is determinable.

12. Which statement about the Illinois timing statutes is accurate?

1. Section 13-104 says Sections 13-102 and 13-103 do not affect enforcement time for rights under a mortgage or lease.
2. Every lease default receives a new 40-year validity period.
3. Every easement expires under the 40-year rule.
4. Section 13-103 is a universal 20-year rule after any event.