Competition and independent decisions
Real estate antitrust violations: how to tell them apart
Two brokerages charge the same fee. That fact alone does not tell you whether they broke antitrust law. Ask what they agreed to do, who would otherwise compete, and which decision stopped being independent. The conduct matters more than the label the participants give it.
Last reviewed:
The short answer
Price fixing coordinates prices or price terms. Market allocation divides customers or territory. A group boycott coordinates a refusal to deal. Bid rigging arranges bids or the winner. Tying conditions one separate product on another and needs further competition analysis. Monopolization concerns monopoly power acquired or maintained through exclusionary conduct, not business success alone. The facts can fit more than one category.
Reviewed October 27, 2026. PSI lists antitrust laws, types of violations, fines and penalties under national X.B.2. The whole Practice of Real Estate domain has 12 of the 100 scored national broker items; antitrust does not have a separate published 12-question allocation. These are original classification exercises, not recalled PSI questions or a prediction of your score.
Find the decision that competitors stopped making independently
- Identify the competitive relationship. Firms may compete for clients, contracts, suppliers or workers. Businesses can compete for the same workers even if they sell different services. Common branding, an association or an independent-contractor label does not itself settle whether separate competitive decision-makers are involved.
- Do not use worker classification as an antitrust escape hatch. The January 2025 worker guidelines expressly address independent contractors as well as employees. They also distinguish naked coordination from restraints subordinate and collateral to a broader collaboration and reasonably necessary to its procompetitive potential. A joint-venture label alone is not that analysis.
- Find the agreement evidence. It may be written, oral or inferred from conduct and surrounding facts. Identical fees, simultaneous changes or a high bid can be clues, but do not prove agreement by themselves. Do not invent a handshake the question never supplies.
- Keep an invitation distinct from an established agreement. A proposal to coordinate fees is a serious concern even if rejected. But where the question expressly says it was not accepted and supplies no shared understanding or coordinated conduct, do not declare a completed rival price agreement proved by the invitation alone. Decline and seek qualified review rather than trying to make the proposal work.
- Ask what was coordinated. A shared commission floor, discount ban, fee cap or price range points to price fixing. A promise not to pursue each other’s clients or neighborhoods points to market allocation. A coordinated refusal to deal with a discount firm points to a group boycott. These labels can overlap.
- For bidding, distinguish competition from a staged result. Agreed cover bids, agreed withdrawals or agreements to take turns winning are bid-rigging patterns. An independently chosen high bid because a contractor lacks capacity is different. A subcontract can be legitimate; it can also be a payoff in a rigged scheme when the agreement evidence establishes that role.
- For tying, identify the desired tying product and the separate tied product, the required linkage, and the relevant power and competitive effects. A useful package is not automatically unlawful. Disclosure of an affiliation does not itself resolve coercion, market power, competition or other applicable legal requirements.
- For monopolization, ask about monopoly power in a relevant market and exclusionary acquisition or maintenance of that power. A popular firm, high price or large share alone does not complete that analysis. A single firm’s conduct can raise this issue without a competitor agreement.
- Distinguish one firm’s own decisions from a pact among rivals. A brokerage’s independently adopted fee policy is different from an industry minimum. An independently chosen service niche is different from a reciprocal promise to avoid a territory. This distinction does not excuse discrimination, agency breaches or other unlawful conduct.
- Do not turn every antitrust question into the same legal test. Naked horizontal price fixing, bid rigging and market division are core per se categories; reasonable-price or “protect the profession” arguments do not rescue those established schemes. Other restraints can need fuller analysis of effects, power, integration and justification. “Per se” does not mean the agreement and other required facts need no proof.
- Treat sensitive information exchanges as a separate risk. Current or future fee plans, individualized compensation, bids or customer strategies can help coordination. An intermediary or software tool does not automatically solve that problem. Public-source observation followed by a truly independent decision is different from agreeing to coordinate through a consultant.
- Read association materials critically. Legitimate education and standards do not shield a disguised price rule or boycott. Historical, aggregated information may differ from current identifiable plans, but it is not automatic permission. The agencies withdrew the referenced healthcare guidance in 2023; do not use old data-sharing safety-zone numbers as a blanket current exemption.
- Check the status of guidance, not just its publication on a government site. The agencies withdrew the 2000 competitor-collaboration guidelines in December 2024. Their February 23, 2026 public inquiry sought input on possible new guidance; that announcement itself did not reinstate the old guidelines or approve any transaction. This is a status distinction, not a claim that all collaborations are unlawful or a complete update service for every later announcement.
- If a rival proposes coordination, do not join the plan or bargain over a better shared rate. Clearly decline, end that discussion, preserve the relevant records and bring the facts to the sponsoring broker and qualified antitrust counsel through the appropriate internal process. This is a teaching response, not a promise that leaving alone erases past involvement.
| Possible category | Key fact | What does not prove it alone |
|---|---|---|
| Price fixing | Rivals agree on a price or price term | Two firms advertise the same fee |
| Market allocation | Rivals agree to divide clients or territories | One firm specializes independently |
| Group boycott | Coordinated refusal aimed at a target | One firm replaces an unreliable vendor |
| Bid rigging | Agreement stages bids or the winner | A high bid without agreement evidence |
| Tying | Desired product conditioned on a separate product | An optional bundle by itself |
| Monopolization | Monopoly power plus exclusionary conduct | A large or successful business alone |
| Sensitive data exchange | Information can facilitate coordination or harm competition | An intermediary is not automatic protection |
The distinctions that matter
| Distinction | How it works | What to notice |
|---|---|---|
| Price fixing and parallel prices | An agreement coordinates price or price terms. Similar prices can also come from separate market decisions. | Shared plan versus same outcome. |
| Allocation and specialization | A reciprocal market division restricts competition; an independent niche does not by itself establish that pact. | “I stay out if you stay out” versus one firm’s choice. |
| Boycott and unilateral refusal | A group coordinates the targeted refusal. One firm’s independent decision does not establish that concerted agreement. | Who agreed with whom, and why? |
| Rigged and independent bids | Rigging prearranges submissions, withdrawals or the winner. A high independent bid is not enough. | Staged competition versus individual judgment. |
| Tying and an optional bundle | A tie conditions the desired product on another separate product; an optional package need not involve that forced link. | Neither “bundle” nor “affiliate disclosed” decides every legal question. |
| Monopolization and success | The issue is monopoly power with exclusionary acquisition or maintenance, rather than superiority alone. | No competitor agreement is necessary for single-firm conduct. |
| Service fee and property price | The commission is the price of brokerage service; a seller’s asking price concerns the property. | Independent advice and client choice do not authorize rival price coordination. |
| Cooperation and collusion | Lawful work on a transaction does not authorize suppression of firms’ independent competition. | A cooperative transaction is not a shared industry fee policy. |
| Internal policy and rival employer pact | One firm’s policy differs from separate firms coordinating pay or recruitment. Contractor status and franchise branding are not automatic exemptions. | Check actual competing decision-makers, including worker markets. |
| Old guidance and current permission | A withdrawn guidance document or a new inquiry is not an automatic safe harbor for a proposed collaboration. | Read the date, status and actual legal conditions. |
Work through the facts
A floor is still a price agreement
Owners of three rival brokerages agree to reject all listings below the same fee. This is a naked pricing pact, with no integrated venture or other qualifying collaboration.
- The firms compete for clients.
- The promise removes independent decisions about the minimum service price.
Answer: Price fixing. Calling the floor fair or necessary for quality does not justify this established naked agreement.
The highway boundary
Two firms that otherwise compete on both sides of a highway agree that each will stop soliciting clients on the other side. The pact is unrelated to any legitimate integrated venture.
- The reciprocal promise divides geographic customers.
- Each gives up competition in exchange for the other doing the same.
Answer: Market allocation. An independent decision to focus marketing on one neighborhood would be a different fact pattern.
A boycott can also enforce a price rule
Rival brokerage owners agree not to show a discount firm’s listings until that firm raises its fee and ends rebates. The question asks what the coordinated refusal is called.
- The refusal is collective, not an independent vendor choice.
- Its purpose is to pressure the target’s competitive price terms.
Answer: Group boycott is the best answer to the specific refusal question. The price-enforcement facts can also implicate price fixing; the categories are not mutually exclusive.
Same fee, different decisions
Three firms independently choose the same advertised fee after considering public cost information. The stipulated facts supply no agreement or indirect coordination.
- The observed result is similar.
- The missing agreement cannot be invented from that similarity alone.
Answer: Those facts alone do not prove price fixing. They are not a guarantee about undisclosed conduct in a real investigation.
Cover bids and rotating winners
Competing contractors secretly agree that Alex wins this job, Blair submits a deliberately losing cover bid, and Casey wins the next job. No legitimate joint-bid collaboration is involved.
- The buyer expects independent competing submissions.
- The bidders instead arrange both the present result and the next winner.
Answer: Bid rigging, using complementary bids and rotation. A paper trail showing several bids does not establish genuine competition.
The high independent bid
A contractor independently submits a high bid because its crews are fully booked. The question expressly rules out an agreement with another bidder.
- A high price can have an independent explanation.
- The stated facts contain no prearranged winner or cover-bid agreement.
Answer: The high bid alone does not establish bid rigging. Suspicious indicators call for investigation; they are not automatic proof.
Identify the two products before concluding
A firm conditions access to its listing-data service on purchase of a separate transaction-management service. Facts about relevant market power and competitive effects are not supplied.
- The access product is the tying product; the required add-on is the tied product.
- The required linkage raises a tying issue, but the missing legal conditions still matter.
Answer: Identify a possible tying arrangement. Do not declare an unlawful tie proven solely from the existence of a package or an affiliate.
Business success without exclusion facts
A brokerage has grown because customers prefer its service. The question supplies no exclusionary conduct or proof of monopoly power in a defined market.
- Success alone is not the monopolization test.
- A rival’s complaint that it is losing clients does not fill the missing elements.
Answer: Monopolization is not established by those facts alone. This does not immunize any separate exclusionary conduct a fuller record might reveal.
A rejected invitation is still a concern
One rival emails a proposed shared fee floor. The recipient clearly rejects it, no other firm accepts, and the stipulated facts contain no shared understanding or coordinated conduct.
- The proposal seeks a loss of independent pricing and should be declined and preserved.
- The facts expressly exclude acceptance or another agreement.
Answer: The invitation alone does not prove a completed Section 1 price agreement on these facts. It can still raise antitrust concerns; rejection is not a reason to delete records or declare every possible legal issue resolved.
An old survey formula is not current approval
An association points to the old numeric healthcare survey safety zone still mentioned in an FTC trade-association article. It says that satisfying those numbers automatically approves a new exchange of brokerage plans.
- The actual 2023 withdrawal notices supersede reliance on that old guidance as a current safe harbor.
- The 2024 collaboration-guideline withdrawal and a 2026 inquiry do not create automatic permission for this survey.
Answer: Reject the claimed blanket exemption. Assess the actual information exchange under current law and qualified advice; neither “aggregated” nor “third party” decides the whole question.
Mistakes to avoid
- “Price fixing only means a price increase.” It can coordinate floors, caps, ranges, discounts or other price terms, including lower prices.
- “Identical fees prove a conspiracy.” Find the agreement evidence; a similar result alone is insufficient.
- “An unwritten promise cannot count.” Oral agreements and agreements inferred from evidence can matter.
- “Every cooperation between brokers is unlawful.” Classify the restraint and actual relationship; legitimate cooperation and naked suppression of competition differ.
- “Every refusal is a per se illegal boycott.” A unilateral refusal and a concerted refusal differ, and some restraints require fuller legal analysis.
- “Tying needs an agreement between competing sellers.” It can concern one firm conditioning products; separate-product, power and competitive facts still matter.
- “The largest firm must be a monopolist.” Market definition, durable power and exclusionary conduct require more than size.
- “Sharing through an association or app is automatically safe.” Intermediaries can facilitate coordination; old data-sharing formulas are not blanket current immunity.
- “An accepted client fee proves an industry rate is legal.” A client agreement does not authorize a separate naked pact among competing brokerages.
- “Leave the meeting and delete the messages.” Stop participating and preserve records. Deletion is not a cure.
- “Independent contractors are outside antitrust law.” The worker guidance addresses employees and independent contractors; examine competition and the actual restraint.
Check your understanding
These are original teaching questions, not recalled or predicted PSI questions. Answer first, then explain why the other choices fail.
1. Competing brokerage owners make a naked pact not to charge below a shared commission floor. What is the clearest label?
- Independent pricing
- A property appraisal
- Tying
- Price fixing
Show answer and explanation
Answer: D. Price fixing
The rivals coordinate a minimum price for brokerage services. The floor need not be called a mandatory industry rate to present the issue.
2. Rival firms agree to divide seller clients by ZIP code, with no legitimate integrated collaboration. What is this?
- A unilateral niche
- Market allocation
- An independent bid
- A home warranty
Show answer and explanation
Answer: B. Market allocation
The reciprocal geographic agreement replaces competition for those clients. Independent specialization would lack that pact.
3. Several rival firms agree to withhold showings from a discount brokerage until it raises fees. What best names the collective refusal?
- A title search
- Group boycott
- Independent vendor selection
- Tying alone
Show answer and explanation
Answer: B. Group boycott
The coordinated refusal targets the rival’s price terms. It can overlap price fixing; the question specifically asks about the refusal.
4. Contractors secretly arrange a winning bid and deliberately losing cover bids. What conduct is described?
- Bid rigging
- Independent pricing
- Open competition
- A title defect
Show answer and explanation
Answer: A. Bid rigging
The supposed competitors prearrange submissions and the winner. Multiple submitted bids do not make that staged process competitive.
5. Firms independently adopt equal fees using public cost information, with no coordination supplied. What follows from the equal fees alone?
- They establish a territory pact
- They conclusively prove an agreement
- They establish a boycott
- They do not establish price fixing
Show answer and explanation
Answer: D. They do not establish price fixing
Parallel prices can result from independent decisions. Do not supply missing direct or circumstantial agreement evidence.
6. Rivals agree to a maximum service fee rather than a minimum. Which statement is correct for this naked horizontal pact?
- Only increases count
- A low fee turns it into a title issue
- A cap is always exempt
- The cap can still be price fixing
Show answer and explanation
Answer: D. The cap can still be price fixing
Price coordination is not limited to raising prices. A cap, range or other price term can be part of a naked price-fixing agreement.
7. One brokerage independently focuses on condominiums, with no pact to avoid other markets. Which distinction matters?
- Every niche divides the market illegally
- Independent specialization is not itself a rival allocation agreement
- A property type always requires shared pricing
- The firm must obtain competitors’ consent to advertise
Show answer and explanation
Answer: B. Independent specialization is not itself a rival allocation agreement
The stipulated unilateral choice is different from a reciprocal promise among competing firms. Other legal duties still apply.
8. One firm independently replaces an unreliable vendor; no rival agreement is supplied. What is missing from a group-boycott theory?
- The concerted refusal agreement
- An appliance warranty
- A loan note
- A property description
Show answer and explanation
Answer: A. The concerted refusal agreement
A unilateral vendor decision does not establish competitors’ coordinated refusal. This is not blanket immunity from other laws or every single-firm issue.
9. Bidders agree to take turns being the winner over several contracts. Which pattern is described?
- A tenancy in common
- Independent capacity planning
- Owner financing
- Bid rotation
Show answer and explanation
Answer: D. Bid rotation
Agreed rotation stages who wins. Similar award patterns without an agreement would be indicators, not automatic proof.
10. A fully booked contractor independently bids high, and the facts exclude rival coordination. What is most accurate?
- The bid creates a boycott automatically
- The contractor must be the planned loser
- The high bid alone does not establish rigging
- Every high bid is criminal
Show answer and explanation
Answer: C. The high bid alone does not establish rigging
The stated capacity explanation and lack of agreement matter. A deliberately high agreed cover bid would be a different fact pattern.
11. A company requires purchase of service B to obtain separate desired service A. Which is the tying product?
- Neither, because a tie requires three products
- Service A, access to which is conditioned
- Service B because it is unwanted
- Both products must be tying products
Show answer and explanation
Answer: B. Service A, access to which is conditioned
The desired product whose availability is conditioned is the tying product; the required add-on is the tied product. Lawfulness needs additional facts.
12. A provider offers a genuinely optional package and each service remains separately available. Which conclusion follows from the package alone?
- It proves a criminal cartel
- It proves monopoly power
- It is exempt from all other laws
- It does not by itself prove an unlawful forced tie
Show answer and explanation
Answer: D. It does not by itself prove an unlawful forced tie
A useful optional bundle can differ from a forced tie. Do not treat that distinction as complete approval under every antitrust or other applicable rule.
13. A firm gains customers through better service. No monopoly-power or exclusionary-conduct facts are given. What follows?
- A competitor agreement must exist
- Being the largest is always unlawful
- Any high price establishes monopoly power
- Success alone does not establish monopolization
Show answer and explanation
Answer: D. Success alone does not establish monopolization
Monopolization concerns monopoly power and exclusionary acquisition or maintenance, not business success alone. A single firm can raise Section 2 issues without a rival agreement.
14. Which statement about monopolization is accurate?
- Any large office is automatically liable
- It can concern single-firm conduct without a rival agreement
- Customer satisfaction establishes exclusion
- It always requires two competing companies to agree
Show answer and explanation
Answer: B. It can concern single-firm conduct without a rival agreement
Do not force the Section 1 competitor-agreement framework onto every single-firm Section 2 question. The required power and conduct still need proof.
15. An association asks rival firms for next month’s individualized fee plans so they can coordinate changes. What is the best response?
- Decline coordination and seek qualified internal review
- Share because association work is exempt
- Delete all prior messages and say nothing
- Share only if it is called voluntary
Show answer and explanation
Answer: A. Decline coordination and seek qualified internal review
The association does not shield a sensitive future-price exchange or coordinated strategy. Stop participation, preserve records and use the appropriate brokerage and legal review process.
16. A consultant passes rivals’ nonpublic planned fees between them to coordinate changes. Does using an intermediary resolve the issue?
- Yes, because consultants are neutral by definition
- Yes, if the file is a spreadsheet
- Yes, because there is no direct call
- No; indirect coordination can still matter
Show answer and explanation
Answer: D. No; indirect coordination can still matter
A third party can facilitate the same loss of independent decisions. The actual information, communications, agreement evidence and competitive effect matter.
17. Which pair can describe the same scheme?
- A real bill of sale and a mortgage by definition
- Market allocation and all independent specialization by definition
- A price-enforcing group boycott and price fixing
- Independent pricing and an express shared fee pact in the same stipulated decision
Show answer and explanation
Answer: C. A price-enforcing group boycott and price fixing
One scheme can coordinate refusals to enforce shared price terms. Select the answer matching the question’s focus without assuming the labels exclude each other.
18. A naked rival fee pact is proved. The firms say the agreed rate is fair. What does that argument do?
- Eliminates the need to preserve records
- Does not justify the established naked price-fixing agreement
- Automatically legalizes the pact
- Turns it into a home warranty
Show answer and explanation
Answer: B. Does not justify the established naked price-fixing agreement
Reasonable-price and protect-the-profession claims do not rescue the established naked horizontal price agreement. Other required elements still need proof.
19. A rival proposes a shared fee floor during lunch. Which is the best exam response?
- Negotiate a smaller shared floor
- Decline, end the discussion, preserve records and escalate appropriately
- Ask the rival to delete the invitation
- Agree but do not put it in writing
Show answer and explanation
Answer: B. Decline, end the discussion, preserve records and escalate appropriately
Do not join or destroy records. Qualified review is needed; ending the discussion is not a promise that any prior participation has disappeared.
20. Does the national outline’s 12% Practice of Real Estate allocation promise 12 antitrust questions?
- No; it covers the whole domain, including other topics
- Yes, 12 questions for every subtopic
- Only if the candidate scores 90% here
- Yes, and the same wording appears each time
Show answer and explanation
Answer: A. No; it covers the whole domain, including other topics
PSI lists antitrust at X.B.2 within the whole 12-item domain. This original practice set does not predict the live mix or validate readiness.
21. A proposed shared fee floor is expressly rejected, and no agreement or coordinated conduct is supplied. What is the best conclusion?
- Rejection authorizes deletion of evidence
- Every rejected invitation proves criminal conviction
- The invitation alone does not prove a completed rival agreement, but still raises concerns
- An invitation is automatically harmless
Show answer and explanation
Answer: C. The invitation alone does not prove a completed rival agreement, but still raises concerns
Distinguish the proposal from acceptance or a shared understanding. Decline coordination, preserve records and obtain appropriate review; do not infer either a completed Section 1 agreement or universal immunity.
22. A survey cites old healthcare safety-zone numbers from guidance withdrawn in 2023. What follows?
- Those old numbers are not blanket current permission
- Withdrawal prohibits every historical survey
- A consultant can override antitrust law
- Every new survey meeting those numbers is automatically lawful
Show answer and explanation
Answer: A. Those old numbers are not blanket current permission
The withdrawal notices matter even when an older FTC article still links to the statements. Current facts and law govern; aggregation and a third party are not automatic immunity.
23. Competing firms propose a naked pact to cap compensation paid to independent contractors. Does the contractor label alone exempt the pact?
- No; the worker guidance also addresses independent contractors
- Yes, only employee wages count
- Yes, if the cap is lower than last year
- Yes, if both firms use the same app
Show answer and explanation
Answer: A. No; the worker guidance also addresses independent contractors
The January 2025 guidelines expressly address anticompetitive conduct affecting independent contractors. Determine the competitive relationship and restraint; a label does not supply an exemption.
24. An eligible claimant has established all conditions for private recovery under 15 U.S.C. 15(a). Actual damages are $20,000. Excluding interest, costs and attorney fees, what is the threefold damages amount?
- $60,000
- $20,000
- $80,000
- $40,000
Show answer and explanation
Answer: A. $60,000
Three times $20,000 is $60,000, not $60,000 plus the same $20,000 again. The facts stipulate eligibility; the statute separately addresses costs and a reasonable attorney fee. This is not a criminal fine or an automatic award for every allegation.
Common questions
How do I identify an antitrust violation in a real estate exam question?
Name the competitive relationship, find the agreement or conduct supplied, and identify the decision being restricted. Price terms, divided clients, collective refusals and staged bids point to different labels. Tying and monopolization need their own conditions. A fact pattern can fit more than one category, so answer the particular question rather than guessing from one isolated word.
Do the same commissions prove price fixing?
No. Similar fees alone do not prove an agreement. Firms can independently respond to the same market facts. An agreement can be oral, written or inferred from evidence, so the absence of a signed rate sheet does not settle the issue either. Independent pricing and covert coordination are different facts.
Can price fixing involve lower fees, caps or discounts?
Yes. A naked agreement among competitors can coordinate minimums, maximums, ranges or other price terms, including discounts. The issue is the loss of independent price decisions, not whether the participants call the result fair or whether the agreed number is higher. A brokerage’s own fee decision does not create permission for an industry pact.
What is market allocation versus independent specialization?
Allocation involves a reciprocal agreement among competitors to divide customers, territories or other competitive opportunities. One firm’s independent decision to focus on a niche is different. Read the relationship and the restraint: a legitimate integrated venture or a limited sale-of-business restriction can require a fuller analysis than a naked stay-out-of-my-market pact. Do not classify every non-compete clause from its name alone.
Is every refusal to work with another firm a group boycott?
No. A group boycott involves concerted refusal; one firm’s independent vendor decision does not by itself establish that agreement. Boycotts used to enforce price terms or exclude rivals raise serious concerns. Other refusals can require additional competition and justification facts. A unilateral decision is not blanket permission to violate agency, fair housing or other applicable obligations.
How do cover bidding, bid suppression and bid rotation differ?
Cover bidding uses intentionally losing agreed submissions to create an appearance of competition. Suppression involves agreed nonbidding or withdrawal to let another bidder win. Rotation takes turns under an arrangement. A legitimate subcontract or a high independent bid does not alone prove rigging. Look for the agreement that stages the result, not merely an unusual number.
What is tying, and is every service bundle illegal?
Tying conditions access to a desired tying product on a separate tied product. The required linkage raises the issue, but separate products, relevant power and competitive effects still matter. Optional packages can be useful; an affiliate disclosure does not automatically cure a forced arrangement. Other laws can also apply. This comparison does not approve a private package or settlement-service arrangement.
Does being the biggest brokerage establish monopolization?
No. Examine monopoly power in a relevant market and exclusionary acquisition or maintenance of that power. Superior service, innovation or business skill alone is different. There is no universal market-share percentage that decides every case, and a firm need not literally control 100% of sales to raise the issue. Single-firm conduct does not always require a rival agreement.
Can a trade association discuss fees or share business statistics?
Association status does not exempt a disguised price rule or boycott. Current, future or individually identifiable sensitive information can facilitate coordination. Public observation and genuinely independent decisions differ from a shared strategy. Historical aggregation and a third party are not automatic permission; the 2023 withdrawal notices make old healthcare information-sharing safety-zone numbers unsuitable as a blanket current exemption.
Does an app, algorithm or consultant make information sharing lawful?
No. An intermediary can facilitate a coordinated strategy. The worker guidance specifically addresses sensitive exchanges through third parties and algorithms. Assess the actual information, relationship and effect; this does not mean every software tool or every public-data analysis is illegal. Keeping some discretion also does not automatically erase a shared scheme.
Are internal brokerage policies the same as agreements between competing firms?
No. An independently adopted policy within a firm differs from separate competing businesses coordinating fees, pay or recruitment. Do not assume common franchise branding merges all decision-makers into one firm. Whether the businesses actually compete, including for workers, and the arrangement’s substance matter. Internal decisions remain subject to applicable client, licensing, employment and other duties.
Can rival firms agree not to recruit each other’s workers?
A naked no-poach pact among competing employers raises serious allocation concerns. A wage agreement raises price-fixing concerns. Businesses can compete for workers even when their products differ. The January 2025 worker guidelines describe agency analysis and possible criminal or civil exposure; they are nonbinding guidance, not a private legality ruling. A genuine ancillary restraint needs its actual collaboration and necessity analyzed.
What does per se mean in these exam scenarios?
For core categories such as naked horizontal price fixing, bid rigging and market division, the rule does not invite a defense that the agreed price was reasonable. It does not dispense with proof of the agreement and other required facts. Not every boycott, tie, vertical arrangement or integrated collaboration receives that same shortcut. Identify the actual restraint before choosing an analysis.
May I simply observe another brokerage’s public advertisements?
Public-source observation followed by your firm’s independent pricing is different from sharing nonpublic plans or agreeing to coordinate. A public statement can also be an invitation to collude, so “it was public” does not protect every message. Consider what was communicated and whether it sought a shared competitive plan.
What should a licensee do when a competitor suggests a shared commission rule?
Do not join, negotiate or continue that plan. Clearly decline, end the discussion, preserve relevant records and take the issue through the sponsoring broker and qualified legal review process. Do not delete the chat or assume silent attendance is a reliable solution. This page does not report anyone, contact an agency or determine liability from a private conversation.
Are these official questions or proof that I am ready for PSI?
No. They are original teaching exercises, and their percentage is not a validated readiness score. PSI’s antitrust listing is national X.B.2 within the whole Practice of Real Estate domain. Review each missed distinction and explain why the alternatives fail; do not treat a repeated practice score as a guarantee about live exam content.
What antitrust penalties should an Illinois exam candidate distinguish?
For a violation covered by Sherman Act Section 1, the statutory criminal maxima include $100 million for a corporation, $1 million for another person and up to ten years’ imprisonment, as provided on conviction. The alternative-fine statute can permit a greater fine tied to twice the greater gross gain or gross loss to others, subject to its conditions, including the undue-complication-or-prolongation limitation. That is not “twice gain plus loss.”
Eligible private recovery under 15 U.S.C. 15(a) is a different issue: threefold actual damages plus the stated costs and reasonable attorney fee, with the applicable prerequisites. A $20,000 stipulated injury produces $60,000 threefold damages before those separate items, not $80,000. A maximum is not an automatic sentence; this comparison does not catalog every civil penalty, state-law remedy or sentencing factor.
Do independent contractors, franchises or new guidance inquiries create exemptions?
No label automatically supplies an exemption. The January 2025 worker guidelines expressly address employees and independent contractors and discuss separate franchise participants. Whether there are competing decision-makers and what they agreed matter. Ancillary restraints need the actual broader collaboration and reasonable necessity analyzed; the guidance is nonbinding.
The agencies withdrew the 2000 collaboration guidelines in December 2024. Their February 23, 2026 announcement sought public input on possible replacement guidance. An inquiry itself is not a reinstatement, new safe harbor or approval of a private arrangement. Do not treat a surviving old link as current blanket permission, or infer that all legitimate cooperation became unlawful.
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Official sources and scope
Reviewed through October 27, 2026. The PSI outline supplies the exam category. Federal statutes and agency materials supply the competition principles; agency guidance is not itself binding law or a private compliance approval. The FTC trade-association article still refers to withdrawn healthcare information-sharing guidance, so this page uses the actual withdrawal notices rather than presenting its old safety-zone formula as current permission.
- PSI June 24, 2026: Illinois II.A and IV.A.1-4 agency and disclosures
- FTC: price fixing
- FTC: group boycotts
- FTC: tying the sale of two products
- 15 U.S.C. 1: Sherman Act offence and maximum penalties
- 18 U.S.C. 3571: alternative fines
- 15 U.S.C. 15: private antitrust recovery
- FTC: market division and customer allocation
- FTC: trade associations, with withdrawn-safety-zone limitation
- FTC: monopolization defined
- DOJ: bid-rigging patterns and limits of suspicious indicators
- DOJ/FTC: January 2025 worker antitrust guidelines
- FTC: withdrawal of healthcare enforcement statements
- DOJ: February 3, 2023 withdrawal notice
- DOJ/FTC: withdrawal of the 2000 collaboration guidelines
- DOJ: February 23, 2026 collaboration-guidance inquiry
This is exam preparation, not advice for a specific transaction. State law and the applicable facts control. Our editorial and corrections process explains how to report an issue.